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Abstract 
In this research, a literature review was conducted where twenty (n=20) frameworks and models highlighting preservation 
of the integrity of digital evidence and protection of basic human rights during digital forensic investigations were studied. 
The models not discussing the process at an abstract level were excluded. Therefore, thirteen (n=13) of the studied models 
were included in our analysis. The results indicated that published abstract models lack preserving the integrity of digital 
evidence and protecting the basic human rights as explicit overarching umbrella principles. To overcome this problem, we 
proposed an extension to Reith’s abstract digital forensics model explicating preservation of integrity and protection of 
human rights as the two necessary umbrella principles. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Digital devices have become an integral part of our lives. Their use is profound and their ability to record 
our activities with extreme detail transforms them into digital behavioral archives of their respective users1–4. 
Between eighty to ninety percent cases in US involve some form of digital evidence (DE)5–7. Digital Forensic 
Science (DFS) evolved to handle this special kind of evidence. In DFS research is being conducted on technical 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 707 713439 
E-mail address: shahzads@dsv.su.se 
  Published by Elsevi r B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://cr ativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- d/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
813 Shahzad Saleem et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  35 ( 2014 )  812 – 821 
and theoretical fronts8. The technical research covers the development of tools to aid in systematic Digital 
Forensics (DF) investigations. Theoretical research covers the development of theories and methodologies 
including processes, frameworks and models to conduct DF investigations8. 
This research work is within the domain of theoretical research, which is important because it provides the 
foundation of DF as a scientific discipline. In addition it stipulates a philosophical account and common 
understanding for DFS as a scientific discipline9. It also assists in (i) the development of abstractions, 
principles, standards and models which are flexible, technology neutral, and generally acceptable10,11 (ii) the 
development of DF process models which are mutually understood, observed and valid in both legal and 
technical contexts12 and (iii) embedding scientific rigor, trust and reliability to facilitate education, application 
and research in DFS13,14.  
A literature review was conducted with twenty (n=20) frameworks and models which are used to conduct 
DF investigations. Thirteen (n=13) of them were abstract, and were used in our analysis. The results indicated 
that the models lack preserving the integrity of DE and protecting the basic human rights as explicit 
overarching umbrella principles. To overcome this problem, we proposed an extended abstract DF model 
explicating the preservation and protection as two necessary umbrella principles (explained in Section 4).  
A model is defined as “the mental image of the world around you”15. It comprises selected concepts and 
their associated relationships in the real world system15. In the light of the definition of a model, and the results 
from our literature review, the analyzed abstract DF models have one of the following two inadequacies: 
1. They do not consider the activities of preserving the integrity of DE and protecting human rights (the 
concept is ignored) and/or 
2. They do not capture and represent their relationship explicitly with other parts of the model which is 
synonymous to the application of the model in the real world (the relationship is ignored).  
To solve these problems, an extension to Reith’s abstract DF model8 was proposed where preservation and 
protection were included as two explicit overarching umbrella principles. We termed the model as an “extended 
abstract digital forensics model with 2PasU” where 2PasU stands for Preservation and Protection as two 
explicit Umbrella principles. 
The remaining sections of this paper discuss the literature review and its summary, explanation of the 
concepts of preservation and protection (2PasU), and how they are incorporated into our model. The last 
section concludes the discussion and indicates about the direction of future research in this domain. 
2. Methodology 
DF models are a set of processes providing a concise, concurrent, abstract and mutually understandable 
foundations on which technical development can progress16. The literature review of twenty (n=20) models was 
conducted with an emphasis on abstraction, preservation and protection (as explained below). 
1. Abstract model: is technology neutral, generic and applicable to every kind of digital crime8.  
2. Preservation: Landwehr defines integrity as a phenomenon of “assuring that digital information is not 
modified (either intentionally or accidentally) without proper authorization”17. In DF preserving the integrity 
of DE as an umbrella principle is important because (i) one of the most quoted DF models “Investigative 
process of digital forensics science”18 highlights the importance of preservation as an umbrella principle. It 
includes the notion of preservation as one of the seven classes and also as a method to all the four classes 
considered “forensic” (ii) DE in its nature is messy, massive, slippery, abstract and transformed 
interpretation of reality19,20 and (iii) holding the integrity and thus the fidelity of DE is not easy because of 
its nature. This fact can consequently shatter the confidence in the veracity of DE upon which decision-
makers act18.  
3. Protection: DF is applied in the areas of (i) Law Enforcement (ii) Military Information Warfare Operations 
and (iii) Business & Industry18. During the review, frameworks and models were studied from the 
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investigative context of law enforcement settings10. The goal in law enforcement settings is to produce 
reliable and admissible evidence under an ordered list of constraints comprising Law, Time, Resources and 
Technical Limits (in order of preference)10. Therefore, compliance to the law is the most important 
constraint. Law with its tools strives to maintain a balance in a society and one of its cornerstones is the 
protection of the human rights. Edward Snowden’s revelations are just an example of possible human rights 
violations in our digital world21. So, protection of human rights must be given foremost importance because 
it is central to the contemporary civilized society and the discipline of DF. 
Following inclusion and exclusion criteria were used during the process of review: 
1. Inclusion criteria: The models and frameworks describing the process of DF with preservation and 
protection attributes were included in this review.  
2. Exclusion criteria: The models and frameworks not describing the process of DF at an abstract level were 
excluded. So, the models describing the technical details and those providing a realization of an abstract DF 
model were excluded.  
3. Literature review 
Seven out of the twenty frameworks and models discussing preservation and protection were not on abstract 
level and hence excluded from our analysis. The remaining thirteen frameworks and models were analyzed, 
qualified and tagged with “Yes”, “To Some Extent (TSE)” or “No” for preservation and protection using the 
following criteria.  
x Preservation: If a model discussed preservation during the entire forensics process in the form of an explicit 
notion of chain of custody, documentation, reproducibility and or non-interference then the model was 
tagged with a “Yes” for preservation as an umbrella principle. Although we tagged some models with a 
“Yes” for preservation but it was observed that most of them failed to capture the concept and its full 
relationship with the rest of the model in the graphical representation. We improved our solution by 
discussing the concept and the relationship along with capturing the representation of the both in the 
graphical form. If a model discussed preservation just prior to collection, partial documentation of evidence 
and or an implicit notion of chain of custody then the model was tagged with “TSE”. If a model did not 
discuss preservation at all then it was tagged with a “No”. 
x Protection: If a model discussed protection during the entire length of a forensics process and also captured 
it in the graphical representation then the model was tagged with a “Yes” for protection. These models 
stressed the need of authorization, minimization, bringing the litigating parties closer to the investigative 
process, guaranteeing the preservation, privacy and or fulfillment of legal requirements for the entire length 
of the forensics process. The model was tagged with “TSE” if the above concepts were discussed for some 
parts of it and with a “No” if the concepts were neither discussed nor captured in the graphical 
representation. 
3.1. Results of the literature review 
Table 1 is the summary of the results from the review process. Please note that Ieong 200622 is a role-based 
framework so it cannot be used in comparative analysis with the rest of the activity based frameworks and 
models. Therefore, it was excluded from the discussion in the results sub-section. First column in Table 1 
shows all the models which were studied and the one at the end is proposed in this article. Second column 
describes whether the model/framework was at the abstract level or not. Third column tells about the level of 
preservation as an umbrella principle, and the last column shows the level of protection as an umbrella 
principle. 
From Table 1, it is evident that preservation is discussed by many of the frameworks and models but only 
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some of them have really captured its relationship with the other sub-processes by considering it as an umbrella 
principle. Some models considered protection of human rights in the form of privacy and conformance to the 
local law, rules and regulation. But almost all of them do not consider protection as an umbrella principle. In all 
the models, the subjects have to trust the process as a black box. Intentional and or unintentional modifications, 
for instance by an unethical insider, can adversely affect many basic human rights. Therefore, we noted that 
2PasU must be explicitly identified and captured during the definition of an abstract model. The section below 
will describe in detail the concept of 2PasU, which is incorporated in our proposed extended abstract model. 
                      Table 1: Summary of the review 
Model/Framework Abstract Preservation Protection 
Reith 20028  Yes TSE No 
Pollitt 20079 No   
Mocas 200410  Yes Yes TSE 
Carrier 200411  Yes Yes TSE 
Pollitt 199512  Yes No TSE 
Beebe 200513  Yes Yes No 
Ruibin 200514 No   
Pollitt 200416 No   
Palmer 200118  Yes Yes No 
Ieong 200622  Yes Yes Yes 
Noblett 200023  Yes Yes No 
NIJ 200124  Yes TSE TSE 
Carrier 200325  Yes Yes TSE 
Agarwal 201126  Yes Yes TSE 
Baryamureeba 200427  Yes TSE TSE 
Shin 201128  Yes TSE No 
Carrier 200329 No   
Kent 200630 No   
Ma 201131 No   
Stephenson 200332 No   
Model with 2PasU Yes Yes Yes 
4. Preservation and protection (2PasU) 
This section is devoted to the description of preservation of the integrity of DE and protection of the basic 
human rights during the process of DF as umbrella principles. It will also explain the term basic human rights 
in the context of DF.  
Evidence is the backbone of our judicial system. DE is an evolved form of traditional evidence, inheriting 
most of the complexities of the latter, while adding more of its own. It is a well-known fact that evidence can 
and has been manufactured, planted, and or taken out of the context to wrongly convict or acquit people33.  
Most people tend to be more careful of what they commit on paper or over a phone, however they may not 
act in the same way when using digital systems such as e-mails, blogs and online discussion forums33 from 
where evidence can be obtained. Furthermore, evidence is usually more compelling than the eye witness’s 
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testimony33. Therefore, preserving the integrity of DE and protecting basic human rights as explicit umbrella 
principles is critical during a forensic investigation. 
4.1. Preserving the integrity of digital evidence as an umbrella activity 
DE is rich, abstract and volatile19,20. To explain the volatility, consider a captured dump of a network. It is 
actually a snapshot of the system at a particular instance of time t1 and the original will not be the same at any 
other time t2. So, at t2, there will exist nothing to compare the image taken at t1 and hence verify its integrity. 
Similar is the case with mobile device forensic images and other live systems. Hence, it is essential to seal the 
master image in such a way that problems arising due to the volatility of the DE are mitigated. Therefore 
setting the theoretical foundation of preserving the integrity of DE as an umbrella principle is an important 
aspect which must be explicitly outlined in the abstract DF model. 
4.2. Protecting the basic human rights as an umbrella activity 
The proposed model stands at abstract level. So, what we present in this section is not an exhaustive list of 
the human rights at stake during the DF process. Privacy (soft and hard), right to know and right of a fair trial 
are the important ones discussed in the section below. 
Privacy is defined as the “right to be let alone, and the right to the informational self-determination”34. It 
enables people to “control, edit, manage, and delete information about themselves and decide when, how and 
to what extent that information is communicated to others”34. The concept of privacy is broad, difficult to 
define and circumscribe35. The Fourth amendment of the constitution of the United States protects the people 
from unreasonable search and seizure36. Many countries either explicitly place the right to privacy in their 
constitution or their courts have recognized this right through other provisions37. 
The literature illustrates many specialized solutions to protect the privacy of the parties involved in the DF 
process. Reddy and Venter38 presented a framework to achieve forensic readiness for privacy incidents. Law et 
al.39 proposed a cryptographic model to protect the privacy during any forensic investigation. To balance the 
requirements of both privacy and forensics, Croft and Olivier40 suggested the sequential release of privacy-
accurate information in a forensic investigation. Their layered system decouples the identity from the data to 
the point where that association is really required. Therefore, it reveals the identity of only the relevant entities.  
Antoniou et al.41 proposed a forensics investigation protocol “Protect Private Information, Not Abuser”. 
This protocol allows the user to surf the Internet anonymously unless the server has gathered enough evidence 
that the user is a potential attacker. In this case, the forensic investigation entity comes into play and reveals the 
identity of the attacker after the necessary investigation. Bohannon et al.42 described a framework based on 
cryptography to handle the privacy issues in forensic DNA databases. Hou et al.43 discussed the privacy 
concerns associated with shared remote servers. They also presented a cryptographic solution based on 
homomorphic and commutative encryption.  
Preserving the integrity of DE and protecting privacy are important concerns for forensic investigations in 
cloud computing infrastructure44.  Problems of jurisdiction, lack of international collaboration, legislative 
mechanism in cross-nation data access/exchange, lack of law/regulation and law advisory are some of the most 
important challenges identified by Keyun et al. in the context of clouds45. 
Digital investigations are restricted by national and international legislation which is more restrictive in case 
of civil litigation. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198446, Computer Misuse Act 199047, Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 198648, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights49, Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 200050, EU directive for Protection of personal data51 are only a few examples of 
these restriction. Usually the constitution, legislation and the related tools place limits on “what” can be 
processed and not on “how” it can be processed. To this end Adams52 proposed the development of a forensic 
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tool with a facility to record all the steps it takes during an investigation.  
A brief discussion of soft and hard privacy concepts in the context of forensic investigation can help to place 
limits on “how” the data is processed. The idea behind the hard privacy is to reduce the need to trust other 
parties and to share as little data as possible. In soft privacy, the subjects lose the control over their personal 
data and have to trust the competence and the honesty of those who control the data.34 
In the context of a forensic investigation the subjects also lose their control over their personal data, out of 
which only a small portion might be relevant to the case. The entire process of a digital forensic investigation is 
like a black box to most of the subjects. Subjects have to trust the correctness of the overall process, the 
competence and integrity of the individual involved in carrying out the process. Concepts from the field of 
security are equally applicable to DFS. From the study of security we know that insiders are the greatest 
threat53 and human beings are the weakest link54 to the overall security of a system. Therefore, subjects should 
be given the “right to know” about not only “what” but also “how” the data is being processed to protect their 
soft privacy.  
The analogy of the “Right to Know” from community and environmental law of the United States has been 
fetched into the domain of DF investigation. It can also help in upholding the “Right of a Fair Trial” which 
must ensure that no one should be wrongly convicted or acquitted either intentionally or unintentionally. If 
Forensic investigation is not conducted properly then it can affect many basic human rights55 as a consequence 
of a wrong conclusion or decision. “The Amero case: Mousetrapping and Pagejacking” and The “Garlasco” 
case: the “IT alibi”56 are the two examples in this context. 
Investigating organizations must regularly define, update and enforce competence requirement and conduct 
proficiency testing57. This can raise the level of quality assurance, soundness of the forensics investigation and 
consequently help in protecting the basic human rights. 
The constitution, legislation and the related tools to safeguard the basic human rights and various research 
contributions to balance the requirements of privacy and forensics by specialized solutions encouraged us to 
explicitly include 2PasU in the extended abstract model. The model will not only highlight the importance of 
2PasU but will also inspire the development of more specialized solutions in this context. Such an extended 
model with 2PasU is discussed in Section 5.  
5. Extended abstract digital forensics process model with 2PasU 
A literature review of the frameworks and models to perform DF at an abstract level revealed the absence of 
2PasU. An extension to the Reith’s abstract models was proposed to overcome the problem. The extension is 
inspired from the research related to preservation and protection (Section 4). The model fulfills functional 
requirements of forensic investigations with the help of seven sub-processes and non-function qualitative 
requirements with two overarching explicit umbrella principles. These principles include preserving the 
integrity of DE and protecting the basic human rights during the entire course of the forensic process.  
5.1. Overarching principles 
Preservation and Protection as defined and described in Section 4 are the two overarching principles colored 
grey in Figure 1. Since it is an abstract model and we are discussing the principles so the list of activities to 
fulfill these principles is flexible including but not limited to the important ones discussed below. 
1. Preservation: Activities included in preservation are (i) preserving the integrity of DE and the platform used 
for investigation, (ii) documentation and the chain of custody encompassing the overall process and (iii) 
isolating and preserving the containers of DE.  
2. Protection: is about protecting the basic human rights including but not limited to (i) privacy both hard and 
soft (ii) right to know and (iii) right of a fair trial. Some risks in this context can be mitigated if the subjects 
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are brought closer to the ongoing digital forensic investigation in such a way that the process no longer 
remains a black box to them. 
5.2. The model with 2PasU 
Our proposed model is inspired from Reith’s work8. It consists of the following list of ordered sub-phases: 
(1) preparation and planning (2) collection (3) examination (4) analysis (5) reporting (6) presentation, (7) 
archiving and returning evidence. Sub-Phases namely collection, examination, analysis and reporting are the 
core forensic activities (colored green in Figure 1) while the rest of them are significant forensic activities 
(colored blue in Figure 1). Explanation to these phases is given below:  
 
Fig. 1. Extended Abstract Digital Forensic Model with 2PasU 
1. Preparation and planning: Activities in this sub-process are not considered real forensics. However, this 
sub-process is the starting point of the investigation. Decisions made during this stage will affect all the 
subsequent sub-phases. Therefore, taking informed decisions at this stage is crucial. 
The basic goal of a forensic investigation is to help provide justice and to protect the basic human rights of 
all the involved entities. Before the raid, an investigator should gather knowledge about the incident to 
decide its type and the requirements. It will enable the investigator to prepare and plan in the light of 
guidelines, best practices, principles, policies, and relevant legislation, to fulfill the requirement of 2PasU. 
The preparation will help gather the most relevant evidence by spending the least amount of resources58. The 
preparation will assist to select the right tool1,3,59,60,  to fulfill the necessary legal requirements (warrants and 
authorizations), to decide the level of management (documentation and chain of custody), and to arrange 
necessary support (reinforcements). 
Since the model is abstract as well as flexible, so investigators decide the level of importance to be given to 
2PasU during this phase following the requirements of the case. We anticipate that 2PasU plays a more 
important role in civilian law enforcement when compared to military settings. 
2. Collection: Deals with preserving the physical evidence and collecting the DE in the form of replicas 
following the requirements of 2PasU. Working on the replicas is the norm in DF, so subjects should also be 
given these replicas with an aim to bring them closer to the ongoing investigation. By doing so they will not 
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have to trust the process as a black box. Depending on the consequences, subjects can also privately run the 
investigation on these replicas to confirm the conclusions drawn by other experts (right of a fair trial). 
3. Examination: of the replica to identify potentially relevant DE in the light of preparation and planning 
phase. Although the order of the steps is preserved in this model but if the requirements of 2PasU are 
relaxed for instance, in military settings then both collection and examination phases can be fused together 
to perform DF triage with an aim to quickly reach to the conclusions58. 
4. Analysis: is concerned with building and supporting a crime theory with the help of relevant and weighty 
DE. The process from collection to analysis can be iterated many times before reaching to the correct 
conclusions while fulfilling the requirements of 2PasU. 
5. Reporting: constitute an expert’s conclusions along with the relevant and weighty DE. It deals with 
summarizing the findings, providing the explanations and conclusions along with the appropriate DE. It is 
written for a layman using abstract terminologies with suitable references and the evidence following 
2PasU. For instance, 2PasU in this sub-phase will require that the reports must have associated chain of 
custody and signed hashes. 
6. Presentation: is an art to infer from DE using logic and common sense. The output of the reporting sub-
phase becomes an input for presentation. The aim of this phase is to present the findings in such a way that 
relevance and weight of the DE is established to the case at hand. In the mind of the trier of the fact, it will 
create an argument for the existence or non-existence of some other matter of fact thus helping in solving or 
furthering a specific case. Any questions related to 2PasU are also answered during this phase. 
7. Archiving and returning: deals with strictly securing and sealing the DE along with all the output of 2PasU 
for any potential future usage. All the forms of evidence seized during the investigation are returned to their 
owners. Any necessary deletion, purging and destruction to protect the basic human rights is also executed 
during this phase.  
6. Conclusions and future work 
Instead of discrete steps in the model, preservation and protection are taken out in the form of umbrella 
principles. The model in Figure 1 now depicts all the important concepts and their relationships with each other 
and thus conforming to the definition of a mental model as well. The model gives due importance to both 
preservation and protection as overarching principles. Hence any future specialized development or realization 
of this model will automatically emphasize on both of these qualitative aspects. In the same time, 2PasU are 
abstract and thus can include a flexible list of activities for each abstract sub-process depending on the 
requirements and the contextual operational settings. 
In the future, we will present a realization of this abstract model in the form of a technical solution operable 
on the collection sub-phase.  Requirements of 2PasU will be fulfilled by employing the latest tools and 
technology in the form of add-on solutions that can extend the capabilities of existing DF tools.  
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